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TWO SEMIOTIC SHIFTS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF NORMS: MEANING 
SHIFT AND REFERENT SHIFT*
abstract
In this introductory paper the guest editors (Paolo Di Lucia and Lorenzo Passerini Glazel) of the special 
issue “Norm: What Is It? Ontological and Pragmatical Perspectives” maintain that the word norm is 
subject to two kinds of semiotic shifts: shifts in the meaning and shifts in the referents. Philosophical 
research on norms and on the normative has, indeed, broadened its dominion of investigation in both 
directions. The phenomena of norms and normativity, intersecting different orders of phenomena, are 
investigated by different disciplines from different methodological perspectives. 
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 Ὁ νόμος ἄρα βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι ἐξεύρεσις.
So law tends to be discovery of reality.
(Plato, Minos, 315a).
The present special issue (vol. 13) of Phenomenology and Mind, “Norm: What Is It? Ontological 
and Pragmatical Perspectives”, originates from the international conference “Qu’est-ce qu’une 
règle? Perspectives ontologiques et pragmatiques” held in Milan on October 13th and 14th, 2016 
with the support of the Dipartimento di Scienze giuridiche “Cesare Beccaria” (Università di 
Milano), and of the Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza (Università di Milano-Bicocca).
The five speakers invited to the conference were: Amedeo Giovanni Conte (Accademia 
Nazionale dei Lincei, Università di Pavia), Paul Amselek (Université de Panthéon-Assas – Paris 
II), Wojciech Żełaniec (Uniwersytet Gdański), Pedro M. S. Alves (Universidade de Lisboa), and 
Pascal Richard (Université de Toulon).
Beside the five contributions of the speakers invited to the conference, the present special 
issue collects eleven papers that were selected through a call for papers issued by the Journal 
on the same subject of the conference.
The philosophical inquiries on the concept of norm run often into difficulties connected to the 
different uses of the word norm (or rule),1 both in ordinary and in technical languages. These 
different uses bring about a difficulty in determining the object of investigation itself.
As Norberto Bobbio recalls (1964/1994, p. 215-232), when we use the expression “It is a norm 
that…” (for instance, in sentences like: “In the United States, it is a norm that people shake hands 
when they are formally introduced”) we may refer either to the fact that there is a norm (a 
rule) prescribing a certain behaviour, or to the mere observation of the constant repetition of a 
certain behaviour. According to Bobbio, in the former case, the normativity aspect of the ordinary 
meaning of the word norm is emphasized; in the latter, the normality aspect is emphasized.2
1  Although in some contexts the terms rule and norm, as well as their equivalents in many languages (règle and norme, 
Regel and Norm, regola and norma, reguƚa and norma, etc.) are not perfectly interchangeable, when emphasis is laid on 
normativity they are mainly used as synonyms. For the sake of simplicity, and to stress our focus on normativity, we 
prefer to use in the following the term norm.
2  According to Avrum Stroll, the “normality” meaning of the word norm is primary, the “normativity” meaning is 
secondary (Stroll, 1987, p. 7).
1. What is a norm? 
1.1. Ontological 
and pragmatical 
perspectives
1.2. Normativity 
vs. normality
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But even when research is expressly focused on the normativity aspect connected to the word 
norm (as distinct from the normality aspect), the object of investigation is hardly uniquely and 
univocally determined: despite the fact that we are accustomed to deal with a plurality of 
norms or rules in almost every aspect of our everyday life, the question “What is a norm?” is 
far from being futile, and the answer to it is far from being obvious.3
Some of the difficulties encountered in answering this question, as well as in determining the 
very object of research on norms and on “the normative”, may be explained in terms of the 
semiotic distinction between meaning (or intension) and referent: both ordinary and technical 
uses of the word norm are subject to two different kinds of semiotic shifts: shifts in the meaning 
(in the intension), and shifts in the referents of the word.
On the one hand, indeed, many inquiries on norms and on the normative have progressively 
laid aside the narrow (prototypical) meaning (or intension) of norm (and of normative) as the 
“prescription of an obligation” by investigating a wider range of different forms of normativity, 
both at the level of normative content (e.g. permissive norms, derogatory norms, constitutive 
rules, technical rules) and at the level of normative force (e.g. advices, recommendations, pleas).4
On the other hand, other inquiries on norms and on the normative have progressively laid 
aside the narrow identification of the referents of the word norm with normative sentences or 
normative propositions by considering a broader range of possible referents, such as normative 
utterances, normative acts, deontic states-of-affairs, mental objects or deontic noemata, 
normative facts, normative events, exemplary behaviours and concrete normative objects.
As a consequence of the heterogeneity of these two kinds of semiotic shifts occurring in the 
use of the word norm, the question: “What is a norm?” can be split into two different questions:
(i) the question concerning the possible meanings (the intension) of the word norm, and 
particularly: “What forms of normativity exist, and what kinds of norms are consequently 
to be distinguished?”
(ii) the question concerning the possible referents of the word norm: “What kinds of entities can 
be norms?”
It is worth recalling  (a fortiori on a journal devoted to phenomenology) that a precursor 
of these kinds of enlargements in the field of philosophical research on norms and on the 
normative was the German phenomenologist Herbert Spiegelberg in his work Gesetz und 
Sittengesetz (1935).
On the one hand, Spiegelberg anticipated the theories of constitutive normativity (and 
in particular that of thetic normativity) in his analysis of the Gestaltungsnormen, which he 
contrasts with the Verhaltensnormen.
3  Even the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright, in his pioneering book on Norm and Action (1963) underlines 
the intrinsic difficulties implied in the philosophical challenge of constructing a general theory of norms and of the 
normative. (It is worth to recall that General Theory of Norms – in German Allgemeine Theorie der Normen – is the title of a 
famous posthumous book by Hans Kelsen).
4  In 1963 von Wright laid the basis of an enlargement of the research on norms and on the normative by soliciting to 
investigate such phenomena as technical rules and constitutive rules, which transcend the category of prescription (von 
Wright 1963, first chapter); nonetheless, in his book he confined his investigation to prescriptive norms. An analogous 
enlargement of the research concerning different forms of normative content and of normative force, was solicited by 
Norberto Bobbio (1964). In the second section of this special issue, Pedro M.S. Alves (2017) specifically distinguishes, in 
a phenomenological perspective, the matter and the quality of nomothetic acts.
2. Semiotics of the 
word norm
2.1. Meaning and 
referents
2.2. What is a 
norm? Splitting 
the question
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On the other hand, he anticipated the investigation of the possible referents of the word norm 
through the determination of sixteen different Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten of norm (Norm), which 
he sorted into six categories.5
Along with the semiotic shifts connected to the meaning and referents of the word norm, there 
is another fact that contributes to making the philosophy of norms and of the normative even 
more challenging.
Normative phenomena intersect different orders of phenomena, such as psychological 
and mental phenomena, linguistic phenomena, logical phenomena, biological phenomena, 
behavioral phenomena, social phenomena, ethical, legal and political phenomena, etc.
As a consequence, norms and normative phenomena are made objects of investigation (or at 
least their existence is presupposed) in a plurality of different sciences and disciplines. 
Since every science and every discipline is based on its own constitutive theoretical and 
methodological assumptions, which make it possible for each of them to investigate a specific 
order of phenomena to the consequent detriment of others, the results achieved by different 
disciplines only partially overlap, and often tend to refract into a plurality of heterogeneous 
perspectives.
However, just as the analysis of the different sections of the visible spectrum contributes to 
our understanding of what light is, the different perspectives adopted in the investigation 
of norms and normative phenomena can contribute to our comprehensive understanding of 
what a norm is.
The papers collected in this special issue of Phenomenology and Mind reflect this plurality of 
perspectives.6
The issue is divided into five sections: the first section is devoted to the concepts of norm and 
to the referents of the word norm; the second section, to the phenomenology of the normative; 
the third section, to the existence of norms and to normative events; the fourth section, to the 
logical and epistemological dimensions of norms; the fifth and last section, to the relationships 
between norms, language and social practices.
The semiotic shifts concerning the meaning and the referents of the word norm are well 
documented in the four papers collected in the first section (“Concepts of Norm, Referents 
of Norm”) of the present special issue. In these four papers, the ontological and pragmatical 
perspectives intertwine, and the question “What is a norm?” is confronted by proposing both 
an analysis of the concepts of norm and an analysis of the entities which the word norm can refer 
to.
In Norme: cinq référents, Amedeo Giovanni Conte challenges the very question: “What is a 
norm?” by making explicit, and criticizing, one of its presuppositions: the presupposition that 
5  The six categories in which Spiegelberg (1935) sorted the sixteen Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten of the word norm (Norm) 
are: 
(i) konkret-gegenständliche Normbedeutungen (concrete-objectual meanings of norm);
(ii) sachverhaltige Normbedeutungen (factual meanings of norm);
(iii) logische Normbedeutungen (logical meanings of norm);
(iv) sprachliche Normbedeutungen (linguistic meanings of norm);
(v) erkenntnismässige Normbedeutungen (epistemic meanings of norm);
(vi)  produktive Normbedeutungen (productive meanings of norm).
On Spiegelberg’s philosophy of norms see Cacopardi (2013-2014) and Di Lucia (2003, pp. 43-68).
6  A recent collection of works also documenting this plurality of perspectives can be found in Lorini & Passerini 
Glazel (2012).
3. A plurality of 
perspectives in 
the investigation 
of norms and 
normative 
phenomena
3.1. Concepts of 
Norm, Referents 
of Norm
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the word norm denotes at least one, and only one kind of entity. He shows, on the contrary, 
that there are (at least) five possible referents of the word norm: a deontic sentence, a deontic 
proposition, a deontic utterance, a deontic state-of-affairs, and a deontic noema. The existence of 
deontic state-of-affairs and deontic noemata as possible referents of the word norm contradicts 
the claim that all norms are linguistic entities (a thesis that Conte also challenges through the 
claim that it is impossible – it would be a sortal incorrectness – to predicate the violation, 
infringement, or transgression of a deontic sentence, of a deontic proposition, or of a deontic 
utterance).7
In Comment je vois le monde du droit, Paul Amselek adopts the methods of Husserl’s 
phenomenology to construct a theory of rules and norms as mental tools. In the first part 
of the paper, Amselek, going beyond the limits which legal philosophy is often restricted 
to, moves from an analysis of the ontology of rules and of norms in general, and rejects 
the “logicism” of many conceptions of norms as linguistic or propositional entities: norms 
are mental tools (which cannot be reduced to propositions), and more precisely they are 
immaterial samples “giving the measure of what is possible”. In his original analysis, he also 
reinterprets from a new perspective the distinction between normative norms (practical rules), 
seen as tools for acting, and scientific laws (theoretical rules), seen as tools for thinking. In the 
second part of the paper, Amselek investigates, in the light of J.L. Austin’s theory of speech 
acts, the pragmatics of normative acts, making direct reference to the world of law: normative 
acts are thus analysed as authoritative acts on the one hand, and on the other hand as mental 
acts, which need be communicated through linguistic signs.
In Les critères et l’ordinaire de la norme, Pascal Richard moves from the circular definition: “law 
is what the law considers as law” (a definition useful for the practice of law, but useless for 
philosophical inquiry) to investigate, in a pragmatical perspective, how the criteria shared 
in the background of a form of life are the unavoidable place of an unfounded certainty. The 
norm as a “mental tool” transmitted by (but not reducible to) a speech act has “no foundation 
but its acceptance in a form of life”. The practice of litigation shows that background shared 
criteria (and, only as a consequence, legal concepts) are always open to scepticism; at the same 
time, it is impossible to go beyond them. Drawing inspiration from Stanley Cavell and Hilary 
Putnam, Richard directly examines the paradoxes of scepticism, and criticizes the perspectives 
both of “regulism” and “regularism”, while adopting an “embodied” pragmatical perspective 
that puts shared criteria, rather than concepts, at the very basis of normativity.
In Constitutive and Regulative Rules: A Dispute and a Resolution, Adriana Placani gives a 
contribution to the analysis of the concept of norm by investigating the phenomenon of 
constitutive rules, as opposed to regulative rules. Placani examines, in particular, Joseph Raz’s 
challenge of the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules as formulated by John 
R. Searle, taking Raz’s critique concerning the inadequate clarification of the criteria by which 
the differentiation can be made very seriously. According to Placani, a clearer criterion for this 
differentiation can be found in the pragmatical analysis of how agents make use of rules, and 
specifically how rules are capable of guiding practical reasoning.
7  A similar remark has been made by Jovan Brkić, who neatly distinguishes “linguistic expressions of normative 
discourse on the one hand from ontological entities called norms, imperatives, and judgments of value, on the other 
hand” (1970, p. 9).
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The second section (“Phenomenology of the Normative”) of the present special issue 
collects three papers investigating normative phenomena and norm-creating legal acts in a 
phenomenological perspective.
In Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine, Pedro M.S. 
Alves outlines a phenomenological theory of “normative consciousness”, understood as the 
intentionality that originally creates norms through “nomothetic acts”. He criticizes Husserl’s 
distinction between norms and judgments, which he considers inapt to rightly account for the 
sense and content of “normative intentionality”; Alves specifically rejects, in the light of Hans 
Kelsen’s theory of norms, the thesis according to which normative intentionality is founded 
upon objectifying acts. However, on the basis of the phenomenological distinction between 
matter and quality of intentional acts, Alves argues, in contrast with Kelsen, Felix Kaufmann 
and Carlos Cossio, that an ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-
content of norms. Alves thus proposes an original account of normative intentionality based 
on the novel concept of “ductive force”. The ductive force of norms cannot be identified with 
simple coercion: a variety of ductive forces can be found even within the legal sphere, ranging 
from sheer coercion to advice and recommendation.
In Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence, Francesca De Vecchi, drawing 
inspiration from the works of Adolf Reinach and Edith Stein, applies the phenomenological 
method of eidetics to the analysis of law-making acts as wholes. De Vecchi argues that the 
parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint (necessary, possible 
or contingent parts), and investigates the hypothesis that the difference between existence 
and validity of law-making acts is to be found in the possible parts of law-making acts. She 
also argues, through the concept of “essential relationship of tendency”, that these parts of 
law-making acts, in spite of being possible, are nonetheless constitutive of the essence of law-
making acts.
In Normative Experience: Deontic Noema and Deontic Noesis, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel examines 
Conte’s distinction of the five referents of the word norm, and focuses on the concept of 
deontic noema. Assuming a perspective complementary to the one assumed by Alves, Passerini 
Glazel investigates normative experience not as the intentionality that creates norms, but as 
the intentionality that makes experience of norms, and raises the question concerning how a 
deontic noesis of a deontic noema can be understood. Through the analysis, in terms of deontic 
noema, of some specific normative phenomena investigated by Hans Kelsen, Ota Weinberger, 
and Leon Petrażycki, Passerini Glazel examines different possible noeseis of a deontic noema: 
he makes a distinction between theoretical noeseis (either cognitive or hypothetical) on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, genuine deontic noeseis, which are at the basis of specifically 
normative Erlebnisse; he then stresses the relevance of the concept of deontic noema on the 
hypothesis that no normative phenomenon would be possible without a consciousness capable 
of normative Erlebnisse.
The third section (“Norms, Existence, and Normative Events”) of the present special issue 
collects three papers investigating the problem of existence and validity of norms, and the 
concept of normative event.
In On the Question of How Social Rules and Social Norms Exist, Christian Bispinck-Funke investigates 
the mode of existence of norms. Arguing for a characterization of a norm as “a multi-
dimensional phenomenon that encompasses mental and linguistic realizations as well as 
3.2. 
Phenomenology of 
the Normative
3.3. Norms, 
Existence, and 
Normative Events
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socially organized bindingness”, he develops an answer to the question of how social rules 
and norms exist by analysing different pragmatic roles played by mental representations of 
norms in social life (in deliberating, in expecting, in demanding, in requesting, in rewarding, 
in punishing, and in evaluating). Special attention is also given to the crucial question of the 
bindingness of norms, which Bispinck-Funke examines in the light of the works of the two 
philosophers and deontic logicians Georg Henrik von Wright and Ota Weinberger.
In Norms, Norms, and Norms: Validity, Existence and Referents of the Term Norm in Alexy, Conte, and 
Guastini, Alice Borghi and Guglielmo Feis challenge the well-known validity-as-existence thesis 
formulated by Hans Kelsen by putting it into relation with the possible referents of the word 
norm as admitted respectively in Amedeo Giovanni Conte’s and Robert Alexy’s theories. Borghi 
and Feis further analyse the philosophical presuppositions of Riccardo Guastini’s rejection 
of the validity-as-existence thesis, and of the contrasting adoption of the existence-as-legal-
membership thesis.
In Normative Events, Federico Faroldi introduces the novel concept of “normative event” and 
distinguishes “nomophoric” and “nomogonic” normative events. Although these two kinds 
of normative events are normatively heterogenous, they are metaphysically homogeneous, 
according to Faroldi: making use of the categories of analytical metaphysics, he maintains that 
both nomophoric and nomogonic events are to be understood as “abstract particulars”.
The fourth section (“Logical and Epistemological Dimensions of Norms”) of the present special 
issue collects three papers investigating logical and epistemological problems connected to 
norms.
In The Challenge of the K-Principle in Deontic Logic (and Well Beyond), Wojciech Żełaniec 
investigates the meaning and the validity of the K-principle of deontic logic – the principle 
according to which if it is obligatory that if p, then q, then, if it is obligatory that p, then it is 
obligatory that q: O(p→q)→(Op→Oq). Żełaniec confronts this seemingly abstract problem 
with the explicit intent to test whether the principles of deontic logic are able to account for 
real-life deontic (moral or legal) discourse. The K-principle is, indeed, something of a challenge 
in this regard. Żełaniec argues that the standard Kripkean semantics in terms of possible 
worlds is not suitable for deontic logic, if deontic logic is to give an account of real-life deontic 
discourse.
In Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective, Sérgio Mascarenhas confronts the question 
of the possibility of applying a logic to norms, given that norms, according to a long-held 
perspective, are not capable of truth values. Moving from Kant’s theory of practical judgment, 
he explicitly argues for the possibility of building a logical pluralistic semantics for norms, 
originally enriched by the introduction of three sets of bivalent values into the analysis of 
modalities (“problematic/unproblematic”, “assertoric/non-assertoric”, “apodictic/non-
apodictic”), and by the association of logical form with a matter corresponding either to the 
domain of nature or to the domain of freedom.
In The Epistemic Novelty of Norms, Giovanni Tuzet raises the question: “What kind of knowledge 
is the knowledge that a norm is the case?”. Assuming the definition of norm as “the content of 
a prescriptive sentence”, he maintains that knowledge of norms is a propositional knowledge, 
i.e. a form of “knowing-that”. Starting from considerations about the way we learn about 
norms, Tuzet introduces the notion of the “epistemic novelty of norms”, and distinguishes 
3.4. Logical and 
Epistemological 
Dimensions of 
Norms
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an absolute epistemic novelty (the epistemic novelty of a non-inferable norm) from a relative 
epistemic novelty (the epistemic novelty of an inferable norm). This distinction is then applied 
to interpret Kelsen’s distinction between static and dynamic normative systems.
The fifth section (“Norms, Language, and Social Practices”) of the present special issue collects 
three papers focusing on the intersubjective and social dimensions of norms, both in relation 
to language practices and to the possible practical conflicts between social and moral norms.
In the perspective according to which linguistic practices as social practices contain implicit 
norms concerning how it is correct to use certain expressions, the first two papers join the 
long-lasting debate stemming from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on language games and 
rule-following, and they both explore the possibility of a naturalistic account of questions 
about the origins of norms and conceptual normativity.
In Expressing Rules, Giacomo Turbanti starts from Wittgenstein’s dilemma about rule-following 
and the metalanguage of rules, and briefly examines the different strategies advanced in 
literature to confront the dilemma (by Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, 
Donald Davidson, John McDowell). Regarding the problem of realism and objectivity, 
Turbanti, following Joseph Rouse, advocates a non-reductionist naturalistic approach, 
capable of integrating both the social and the biological dimensions of cognition; he draws 
inspiration from Michael Tomasello’s view that human thinking is essentially cooperative. 
Distinguishing the selective pressure exerted by natural evolution and cultural learning (which 
can only be explained in the context of existing discursive practices) respectively, he opts for 
an expressivist strategy based on a pragmatic, rather than a semantic, metavocabulary for 
expressing rules.
In Reconstructing Intersubjective Norms, James Trafford challenges Richard Brandom’s attempt to 
ground norms in intersubjective practices. In opposition to Brandom, Trafford argues that the 
forms of interaction implied in dialogue and in the institution of norms are to be investigated 
primarily as sub-intentional processes. In this sense, according to Trafford, norms are just 
“the regularities produced by adjustment and correcting mechanisms of feedback internal to 
interactions with each other” leading to the “reinforcing of stabilities in those interactions” 
and to “their recognition as being appropriate or inappropriate”.
In The Imperative of Reputation Between Social and Moral Norms, Gian Paolo Terravecchia 
investigates the phenomenon of reputation and the possible conflict between the imperative 
to maintain or to improve one’s reputation – regarded as a pre-moral social norm “blind to 
values and to moral good” – and the moral sanctioning of hypocritical efforts to improve one’s 
reputation.
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